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Summary 
 
Following and extending the works made by Mondello and Rishe in 2003 and 2004, the 
first purpose of this paper is to explain the causes for the seasonal change in ticket prices in the four 
major sports leagues in the United States for the period 1991 / 2017.  
The main interest is to provide the main factors that are likely to influence price change 
from a season to another, and also some hints for professional sports teams to consider a movement 
in their ticket prices, in response to diverse phenomena like playing in a new stadium, a new city or 
after a huge achievement like winning the championship. Ticket pricing is still very important for 
team management considering it has a direct impact on the revenues. Having a benchmark of what 
has been done in the past could be helpful for setting the appropriate price.  
The results show that new location, new stadium, and the price increase the season before 
have the most impact on the variation from a year to another. Success on the field the previous 
season and wages increase also play a significant role for the ticket price variation. On the contrary, 
we can’t really find significance between financial data like debt level or profit and price change.  
 
In the second part, we will try to check if the instauration of a salary cap have an impact on 
the marginal operating cost efficiency. The marginal cost being the standardized payroll increase of 
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the teams, and the efficiency being the progression of the performances on the field (i.e. winning 
percentage). A salary cap is a maximum amount in terms of total salary an owner can give to his 
players. With such a restrictive rule, one can imagine that owners and general managers will be even 
more careful when they spend their money on recruiting players, and therefore increase the 
efficiency. The scarcity of the resources should lead to a better utilization of these resources.  
The main goal is to provide information to sports leagues that haven’t implement a salary 
cap yet, like MLB or European soccer, by giving them some hints about how the competitive 
balance could evolve in the case of a salary cap regulation. Because if the increase of the player 
wages is a major concern for the future of these sports, they also have to think about the competitive 
balance they are looking for. And what kind of consequences could have the implementation of a 
salary cap? 
To find out, we use a natural experiment by comparing NHL and MLB. NHL added the 
salary cap rule in 2005, while MLB never put such a rule in place. The results show that while NHL 
teams were less efficient than MLB teams in terms of salary spending that lead to increase winning 
percentage before 2005, they became a lot more after 2005, easily surpassing MLB teams. It 
suggests that facing a scarcity of resources, teams tend to increase their efficiency in term of 
recruiting better players and/or staff.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND PAST LITERATURE 
Section 1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature of sports is abundant on several topics. However, when it comes to the ticket 
price, the literature is not especially plentiful. Recently, some papers explore the secondary market, 
as it is probably the most dynamic one, especially with the Internet. It provides a huge interest for 
studying the consumer behavior, because it concerns intermediaries and final buyer, but doesn’t tell 
much about the professional teams pricing strategy.  
The first part of this paper will focus on the primary market, from the team perspective, on 
how they conceive their pricing strategy. And moreover which factors are the most likely to 
influence a price change between two seasons, and how big will be the change in response to these 
factors?  
The dynamic pricing strategy has becoming very popular for the last decade. The variation 
of prices within a season, week days versus weekends, premium versus cheap seats, premium game 
versus standard ones… teams have a lot of tools at their disposal to increase the attendance, and, of 
course, the bottom line. Since the beginning of the nineties, the gate receipts of the teams in the four 
North American major sports (i.e. NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL) has increased quite significantly. 
However, the share of gate receipts in the total revenues of the teams is decreasing, and for all the 
sports (appendix A). In fact, the absolute level of gate receipts increased constantly during these last 
three decades, but the tremendous increase of the TV broadcasting rights offset this progression. 
With some slight differences between sports. For example gate receipts represents only 16% of the 
NFL team’s revenues in 2016, the lowest by far. Which is logical because during an NFL regular 
season, a team plays only 8 games at home. NHL is the opposite, with still more than 35% of the 
total revenues represented by gate receipts. More games, and lower broadcasting rights explain this 
difference. But the pattern is the same for all sports: a decrease in share, but at a relatively moderate 
pace. 
That said, this level is still far from negligible. And justify the application of the most 
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appropriate method to set team’s ticket prices. And as stated by Brunkhorst and Fenn in 2010,”The 
NFL allots a share of the revenue produced from sales of NFL merchandise to be distributed among 
teams in the league. The revenues generated by these contracts are divided equally among all teams. 
The teams have virtually no control over the revenue they receive from league sharing. Therefore, 
owners focus on gate receipts, which they can control. Owners can set ticket prices to maximize 
profits for the season.” Since the revenue sharing exists in other leagues too, they’re all facing the 
same issue.   
Because it is very complicated to integrate all the tools employed in a single research (and 
in fact, nearly impossible to find all the different prices in a long run), this paper will focus on the 
average ticket price available on the first market, i.e. set by the teams. A control will be made for 
premium seats, to check whether or not there is a significant difference between average prices and 
premium ones. Despite an active yield management, the average ticket price still makes sense 
because it includes and reflects all the tools described above. At the end of a season, the bottom line 
of gate receipts is a simple product of attendance and average ticket price.  
The sample starts in 1991, until 2017, providing a robust sample size. The decision to 
study the four major leagues came because even if the general pattern should be the same, we expect 
to find significant differences within the sports.  
Everything takes place in North American major cities, and concerns North American 
sports fans. There is a specificity for the NHL with 6 Canadian teams, but it doesn’t affect the market 
size of the league, on average, compare to the three others. Toronto, Montreal, Calgary or Ottawa 
have nothing to envy to their US counterpart (appendix B). 
All the sports have been treated separately, but also together in a global regression. Both 
are interesting, because this paper is about the change of the ticket price from a season to another, 
not about the ticket price level (NFL ticket prices are 3 times higher than MLB, on average). The 
factor that will influence an increase or decrease of the price should have many similarities, while 
the level of ticket price is different in each league (appendix C and I). NFL offers 500.000 seats a 
year, while MLB is around 5.000.000, even if they play in similar size stadiums. The number of 
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game is totally different, and the possibility to apply a different price during weekdays and weekends 
exist in MLB, not NFL. NHL and NBA are completely similar, even sharing sometimes the stadium, 
and the number of game (41 games at home every season). Their season starts at the same time and 
close also same period. They offer around 750.000 seats a year to their fans (post season not 
included for all these figures).  
By studying their behavior for 25 years, we see some regular pattern among all the leagues, 
like the very strong effect of playing in a new stadium or a new city. Franchises that enjoyed these 
two events saw their price increasing significantly. However, if those two events of a team life are a 
main reason for changing the ticket price drastically, it is not the most common one, far from it. 
Success on the field the previous season and wages increase also play a significant role for the ticket 
price variation.  
The main surprises, to the best of my knowledge, are the weak effect of lockout (partial or 
total cancellation of a season due to player strike), championship won, level of profit and debt. One 
could have expected a stronger effect from all these variables on ticket price alteration.  
 
After this initial research, we will try to dig deeper the marginal operating costs efficiency 
of professional teams, using the same data sample, but focusing on NHL and MLB only. More 
specifically, we will try to check if the instauration of a salary cap has an impact on the marginal cost 
efficiency. A salary cap is a limitation on the amount of money a club can spend on player salaries 
for a given season. The cap is usually deﬁned as a percentage of average annual revenues of the 
league and limits the club’s investment in recruiting talented players. NHL uses this system since the 
season 2005/2006 (Appendix D). It is a result of a free agreement within a league, that’s why it is not 
illegal. Furthermore, the reason to use such a tool is supported by the willingness to increase the 
competitive balance and maintain the financial stability of teams, in addition to avoid crisis with 
players like the one in NHL that leaded to cancel the entire 2004/2005 season. The NHL agreement 
ensure players and owners to share 50/50 of the revenues, which means that the increase of the 
revenues lead mechanically to an increase of the salary cap (Appendix K, to see the wage/revenue 
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ratio over time). 
Using the instauration of the salary cap in NHL from 2005/2006 season, we will conduct a 
natural experiment to check whether or not this limitation of the investment resources has an impact 
on the efficiency of the team results on the field. A control will be made using the MLB teams, 
because they have never experimented such a reform, with a formal limitation of salary spending. 
MLB uses a luxury tax though, which consists on applying a tax to teams that would exceed a 
certain amount for the payroll. NBA and NFL are therefore not include in this part. They both use a 
salary cap for a long time, making the comparison complicated, if not impossible, because we don’t 
have consistent payroll data before the nineties.  
In this paper, what is considered as marginal operating costs is only the total wages 
increase/decrease of a team on excess to the league average from a season to the next. Because on 
average, salaries are increasing each and every year (Appendix J), it is better to use standardized data. 
And the proxy for efficiency will be the winning increasing/decreasing percentage in the regular 
season, from the previous season to the next. This follow the general theory accepted by many 
economists (Rottenberg, 1956; Noll, 1974; Fort and Quirk, 1995, Kesenne (1996), arguing that the 
profit function of a professional sports team is: 
Maximization of winning  
Subject to Revenue - Cost = 0   
Where the revenue function is assumed to be concave in the winning percentage.  
 It has been subject to controversy, especially the second part, but here we are mainly using 
the winning maximization assumption.  
Results show two interesting things. First of all, there is an efficiency: when a team is 
increasing its total wages more than the league average, it enjoys more wins. Which means that there 
is a certain, albeit unequal, marginal costs efficiency in NHL and MLB. Noteworthy that this 
efficiency is not equal to the effort made: you won’t enjoy 10% more victories if you invest 10% 
more than the league average, far from it. The glorious uncertainty of outcome in sports still holds, 
of course. 
 5 
More interestingly, it seems that the payroll efficiency increases when a salary cap is 
implemented: while the NHL teams were less efficient than the MLB teams before 2005, the 
situation is the opposite afterwards. While MLB teams are even less efficient after 2005 than they 
were before, NHL teams are almost three times more efficient after the salary cap was installed. It 
shows that in a market where the resources allowed are limited, team’s management tend to spend 
their money more efficiently. Teams tends to do a better job in using additional dollars to recruit 
better players if they know the amount of dollar available is strictly limited. Once again, we are 
studying the increase of percentage winning during the regular season, from a season to the next. 
The efficiency costs being the difference between an individual team wages progression from a 
season to the next and the league average progression.  
Those results are interesting, especially for sports leagues that still wonder if they should 
install a salary cap or not: MLB, but also European soccer, are among them. The impressive increase 
of the player salaries is a major concern for league managers. And salary cap might be a powerful 
tool to preserve sports wages from a bubble effect, but without changing the nature of the sports and 
his competitive balance.  
 
In brief, to make the agenda clear:  
- The first purpose of this paper is to find and explain the causes for the seasonal changes in 
ticket prices in the four major sports leagues in the United States for the period 1991 / 2017. 
The main interests are to provide both the main factors that are likely to influence price 
direction from a season to another, and also some hints for professional sports teams to 
consider a movement in their ticket prices, in response to diverse events that can occur 
frequently or not. Having a benchmark of what has been done before could help them to 
better estimate future changes, considering that gate receipt is still representing a big part of 
their revenue.  
- The second part of the paper will try to determine if the instauration of a salary cap has an 
impact on the marginal operating cost efficiency of the teams: facing a limitation of salary 
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they can give to players, do teams invest more accurately to fulfill the ultimate goal of 
winning more games on the field? Using the 2005 salary cap regulation in the NHL and 
controlling with MLB, the interest of the research is to check if the theory of “scarcity leads 
to more efficiency” applies in the sports field too. Ultimately, it could provide information 
to leagues that haven’t implemented a salary cap yet, like MLB or European soccer, by 
giving them some hints about how the competitive balance could evolve in the case of a 
salary cap regulation.  
 
The paper will be organized as follow: first we will check the past literature. Chapter two 
will introduce the empirical model, the data set, and present the main findings. Last section will be 
dedicated to the conclusion. 
 
Section 2. PAST LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1. Ticket price determination 
In 2001, Reese & Mittelstaedt realized a survey at the end of the 1998 NFL season asking 
directly the individuals responsible for ticket pricing what determinants they use in ticket-pricing 
strategy. In order of importance, they found that team performance, revenue needs of the 
organization, Public Relations Issues, toleration of the market regarding price increases, fan 
identification and average league ticket price are the main factors. The strength of this study is 
obviously that they asked directly to the people in charge of fixing the pricing strategy… The 
weakness being that it provides only a ranking, not the size of the effect.  
 
Mondello and Rishe (2003) tried to explain both cross-sectional differences in ticket prices 
across teams (1st step) and causes for the size and direction of seasonal price increases in the NFL 
(2nd step). They show that the winning rate of the previous season, the income of the fans, the market 
size, and playing in a new stadium have a significant impact on average ticket price, for the 
1996-2001 period. On the contrary, there is no evidence that the size of the payroll impact the 
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average ticket price. For them, it is not inconsistent with the fact that the salary cap in NFL might 
alter the influence of payroll on ticket prices.  
On their second step, they found that changes in win percentage, reaching the conference 
championships, the size of the average ticket price increase of the previous year and playing in a new 
stadium are significant. No significance for the change of the payroll. They noted that this is an 
important result, since a lot of club owners claim that they have to raise ticket prices in response to 
an increasing payroll for players. They added that the fact that their model wasn’t able to offer more 
than 50% of explanation for ticket prices (neither for cross sectional differences between teams or 
seasonal changes with each individual team) show that this is the evidence that it is nearly 
impossible to determine a standard pricing model in Football.  
 
Following their works about determinants of ticket price in NFL, Mondello and Rishe 
extended their work to the four major leagues in 2004. They used the results of their first study, and 
particularly the absence of influence of team payroll on ticket price, to extend to the three other 
major leagues. Since MLB and NHL had no salary cap at that time, it was interesting to do a natural 
experiment and compare with NFL and NBA, two leagues with a salary cap.  
The process used was exactly the same but over the period 1996-2002, which means 7 
seasons. They found both general pattern and some differences for the four sports. Concerning the 
price differences among the different teams, they found that market size (proxy = population of the 
city) and playing in a new stadium are important determinants. Surprisingly, despite the fact that 
they found significance in income of the population, they never found a coefficient that could really 
explain the cross sectional ticket price difference. Larger payroll leads to higher ticket price in 
baseball and basketball only. 
Concerning the seasonal increase, playing in a new stadium and reaching the postseason 
are significant determinants of the ticket price change, while the payroll is only significant in 
baseball, where you have no salary cap, and where the payroll dispersion is extremely important 
compare to the three other sports. In details, MLB shows the strongest correlation in their model. 
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New stadium means 50% increase in the ticket price over their sample period! Playoff participation 
and attendance increase the year before, and payroll increase have also an effect, but far less 
impressive of course. Surprisingly, the sample doesn’t show any trend over the period, and no effect 
of the previous seasonal increase on the new season decision. NBA shows significance for new 
stadium (+27%) and playoff participation only. Negative trend of prices, which is representative to 
their sample period but absolutely not for the past three decades. NFL and NHL also shows effect for 
new stadium (over 25% for both) and playoff participation. Regarding the seasonal change, post 
season performance of the previous season are also very important, with an increasing power from 
simple playoff participation to last game of the season participation.  
The two OLS models fit MLB the most, and NHL the less. They noticed, and it will be the 
same in this paper, that the overall explanatory power is not so strong. Therefore, “hard to quantify” 
variables are certainly omitted in the model. It shows statistical evidence that the price determination 
process is quite subjective for each individual sports team, and therefore hard to standardize. They 
use the argument of a strong and significant intercept for both equations to justify this statement.  
 
1.2.2. Ticket price as a tool in sports finance literature 
Brunkhorst and Fenn (2010) investigate if NFL teams maximize profits with respect to 
ticket price. They used and modified Ferguson et al’s (1991) NHL paper as it pertains to the NFL. 
Their results indicate that over 80% of NFL teams set ticket prices in a manner consistent with gate 
receipt and profit maximization. NFL franchises act in accordance with profit maximizing behavior. 
These findings go against the common notion that franchises always try to win the most games as 
possible, and are not profit seeker.  
 
Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys (2007) confirm previous findings in the literature 
that demand for tickets is inelastic with respect to price. However, they found differences between 
sports. For example, while demand is inelastic in both the NBA and MLB, the ticket price elasticity 
differs in size. The evidence here is that demand for tickets to NFL games is quite unlike demand for 
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tickets to baseball or basketball games. The instruments used to identify the endogenous variables in 
the MLB and NBA demand equations are not found to be valid in the NFL equations. Coefficient 
estimates from the NFL equations are, generally, much less likely to accord with demand theory than 
are the estimates from the MLB and NBA equations. This can be partially attributed to differences in 
the likelihood of a contest selling out all the seats in the stadium. Sellouts are much less frequent in 
baseball and basketball than in football. This is something that we will find in the ticket price 
alteration too. NFL is the less influenced sport by “rational” behavior when it comes to set ticket 
price. 
 
Lastly, Yang-Ming Chang, Joel M. Potter and Shane Sanders (2016) look into profit 
maximization for sports teams. They state that firm theory implies that a monopoly maximizes profit 
somewhere along the elastic portion of its demand curve. However, empirical studies of sports ticket 
pricing shows that teams set their ticket price along the inelastic portion of demand. The new thing 
in their research is that profit-maximizing team considers not only direct marginal revenue and direct 
marginal cost when setting a ticket price but also deferred, strategic benefit from present game 
success. Prior literature finds that a given win is valued in that it generates additional future revenue 
and likelihood of home victory rises, ceteris paribus, in crowd density. The authors construct a firm 
profit maximization problem in which a sports team considers both present and future revenue when 
pricing home games in the present period. They found that if the deferred benefit is sufficiently large, 
a forward-looking, profit-maximizing team prices along the inelastic portion of its static demand 
curve. Importantly, this same price falls along the elastic portion of the firm’s (empirically 
unobserved) dynamic demand curve. This study gives hints about the recent pricing strategy of 
sports teams, showing the impact of immediate on-field results in a profit maximization context.  
 
We will now have a look of the pas literature that is linked to the second part of the paper.  
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1.2.3. Winning and payroll efficiency 
When it comes to the sports financial or economics area, the profit maximization is 
especially popular. Researchers are also very interesting in revenue sharing and competitive balance. 
I summarized below some of the most important papers related to this field, which might help to 
understand better this paper. 
 
Quirk & Fort (1999) argued that under a free agency system, teams should get pretty much 
what they paid for. They looked at the correlation between the rank of regular season winning 
percentages and the rank of player payroll cost for the years of 1990 to 1997, in the Major League of 
Baseball. Their findings were that this correlation was 0.509 in the American League and 0.135 in 
the National League. However, none of these were statistically significant and thus they concluded 
that payrolls could not explain the team performance in baseball. 
 
Shahriar Hasan (2008) found strong evidence that during the regular season games, the 
payroll plays a significant positive role on the performance. Using a track record of 16 years of 
winning percentages and pay-scales of the MLB teams, he investigated the relationship between 
team performance and payroll. Although the results of the individual team studies were not 
conclusive, the results were prominent when all teams are included in the data. Different variations 
of the pooled data were used to test the robustness of the outcome. This is interesting because it 
shows that MLB teams with the highest payroll win more than the others. And it is contradictory 
with Quick and Fort’s findings.  
 
In 1998, Paul D. Staudohar examined the nature and operation of salary caps in basketball 
and football, and the controversies and arrangements over the issue in baseball and hockey. Because 
salary caps can be viewed as a counterpart to free agency (freedom for players, after the end of their 
contract, to move for another team), there is particular interest in how these two features interact.  
Salary caps are also viewed in the broader context of owners versus players, and their effects on 
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collective bargaining. The findings do not suggest that there is a significant difference between a soft 
salary cap and a payroll tax as far as placing limits on salary growth is concerned. If a salary cap 
were enforced as a hard cap, the difference might be greater because this would be a firm and direct 
limit.  
 
Késenne (2000) uses a two-team model consisting of a large and a small market club and 
shows that a salary cap defined as a fixed percentage of total league revenues in the previous season 
divided by the number of teams, will improve competitive balance as well as the distribution of 
player salaries within the league. 
 
In 2009, Fort and Winfree showed that both the marginal product of talent in the 
production of winning and its marginal revenue product depend critically on the elasticity of talent 
supply and the form of the contest success function. This suggests that league equilibrium outcomes 
will depend on these same factors. And since the marginal revenue product of talent is a positive 
transformation of the marginal product of talent, the same cautions hold, plus one more: the 
concavity characteristics of revenues from winning also matter. Indeed, for the general logistic 
contest success function, for some combinations of these factors, the marginal revenue product of 
talent can slope upward. 
 
We will now move on the second chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Section 1. DATA SET 
The particularity of studying the four major professional sports in the US is that the 
population size is small, with only 123 professional sports teams. It is therefore easy to work with 
the entire population, and not a sample. The counterpart is that the sample size is not extendable.  
The sports results and attendance data were collected via ESPN, baseball / basketball / 
football / hockey-reference websites. These informations are globally largely available on many 
different websites. Very important to notice that in this entire paper, when we talk about winning 
percentage, it refers to the regular season only, not the post season. Some other variables have been 
created to capture the post season effect.  
The average and premium ticket prices are collected from Rodney Fort (collected via 
TMR) and Forbes websites. Average ticket price represents a weighted average of season ticket prices 
for general seating categories, determined by factoring the tickets in each price range as a percentage 
of the total number of seats in each venue. Premium seating (tickets that come with at least one added 
amenity or is classified by team as premium) are not included in the survey to calculate average ticket 
price. Luxury suites are also excluded from the average ticket price. Season ticket pricing is used for 
any team that offers some or all tickets at lower prices for customers who buy season seats.  
Financial data were also collected from both Forbes and Rodney Fort websites. The 
Canadian data are converted from CAD to USD at the conversion rate of the year involved (current 
US dollar). 
Overall, the dataset consists in 123 professional teams, almost equally distributed in four 
sports. The sample period is 27 seasons (1991-2017). Due to data limitations, like the NHL lockout 
that cancelled the entire 2004/2005 season, you can find some differences between the four sports in 
term of sample size in the different regressions.  
For the second part of the study, regarding the effect of salary cap on winning, only NHL 
and MLB were considered, which means 59 teams, on the same sample period.  
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The results are expressed in percentage, because the two studies explore price and winning 
progression: this is therefore the most relevant way of interpreting the result from my point of view.  
The regression output presented in section three were obtained: 
- Using a panel data method, with fixed effect for the ticket price alteration. This model was 
used because of the cross sectional time series data set.  
- Using a traditional OLS regression with an interaction term, to check the effect of a salary 
cap rule on the marginal costs efficiency, before and after the salary cap regulation. 
Diagnostics control have been made for Error term normality, heteroscedasticity, influencial data 
and multicollinearity.  
Table I and II, included in the next section, summarize the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the two models.  
 
Section 2. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
2.2.1. Ticket price changes 
As explained in the introduction, this paper will consist in searching the factors that impact 
ticket price change for sports teams, from the previous season to the new one. To fulfill this goal, the 
following panel data with fixed effect model will be used: 
 
Where: 
= percentage of change of the average ticket price of the team i at the time t. Noteworthy that this 
is the ticket price change from the previous season (t-1) to the new one (t).  
 = coefficients of the independent variables.  
s = structural change from a season to a new one 
p = past performances 
f = financial/investment data 
 = error term, fixed effect, assuming that it is constant among teams 
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Main hypotheses  
There are of course several potential factor that influence a change in ticket price. In this 
study, these factors will be divided in three categories: structural, past performances and financial 
data. These three categories have been selected based on past studies, especially the one by 
Mondello and Rishe in 2004, but also because we are talking about price change, and not absolute 
value of price. Therefore, the price alteration has to be a consequence of something important that 
happened recently in the life of the team. Structural changes are the most likely to impact the ticket 
price, because they are big events in the life of a team, like playing in a new stadium or a new city. 
The recent performances of the team on the field are also likely to impact, for a simple reason of 
supply and demand: the better the show offered to potential ticket buyers, the higher the price can be 
set. Finally, following a previous study by Reese and Mittelstaedt in 2001 among NFL managers, it 
sounds that they react to financial data to set their price level. It means that they should react to 
change in their financial statements, like the level of debt, profits, or even to a change in the wages 
(the first source of cost for a sports team, by far).   
 
The different hypotheses tested are detailed below:   
- Structural change effect:  
1) Playing in a new stadium: positive effect due to the fact that the new facilities are expected 
to be better than the previous ones. And because it is very likely that there is a financing 
process behind the new stadium, with a loan to reimburse. Playing in a new stadium means 
a real new one: teams that experienced a city relocation, but play in a stadium already built, 
are not considered in that category.  
2) Playing in a new city: one can expect that in order to attract a maximum of supporter, 
especially for the first year playing in a new city, it is very likely that the team will chose an 
aggressive pricing policy. On the other hand, the excitation of having a new professional 
team in a city should counterbalance that effect… Moreover, when a franchise makes the 
decision to move, they generally do it for a more attractive market, whether because it’s a 
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larger market or a less competitive one. And as Rishe and Mondello showed in 2004, the 
market size is an important factor to determine the ticket price. Therefore, a positive impact 
on the ticket price change is expected. Once again it is a dummy variable.  
3) Lockout effect: lockout occurs in general when owners and players doesn’t agree on the 
bargaining agreement. In this study this effect will be only considered when the lockout was 
severe enough to cancel some regular season games or the entire season like in 2004/2005 
for the NHL. Owners must be balanced between the willingness to get their money back by 
increasing prices, but also trying to attract their client again by having an aggressive pricing 
policy. When a company fails to deliver the delivery on time, you expect to get a discount. 
The same phenomena should apply here. Only NBA and NHL experienced lockout with 
cancelled games during the period 1991/2017. Another dummy variable.  
- Past performance effect: 
4) Performances the season before: the winning or increase of wins of the previous season 
should impact the ticket price change for the new season. Similarly, a team that just 
achieved a big success like reaching the post season or winning the championship is very 
likely to increase his ticket prices. A regression has been made with playoff participation, 
being runner up and winning the title. The longer the post season, the higher the price 
increase is expected for the season to come.  
5) How would a team move his price ticket one year after the previous move in prices? Is there 
a virtuous effect in price increase or the opposite, meaning that a franchise would be more 
likely to let their fan “take a breath” after a previous augmentation? It is more likely to be 
the latter, as “trees never reach the sky”, we expect that teams are reluctant to increase their 
price significantly right after a previous increase.  
6) Attendance percentage increase of the year before: expected to generate a price increase, 
especially if your attendance percentage is close to 100%. Because in that case, it means 
that the demand is superior to the supply. Needless to say that one would expect an increase 
of the price in that case. For the record, John Locke, 1691, "The price of any commodity 
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rises or falls, by the proportion of the number of buyers and sellers”. 
Financial / investment variables effect: 
7) A significant improvement in the quality of the team roster. The proxy for that factor would 
be the increase of the wages from the season before to the new one. Intuitively, a positive 
impact is expected. When the management made a huge effort to enhance the quality of the 
players or staff, you expect them to set the ticket price higher to amortize this investment, 
assuming that the show they will offer to their fans will be a better one. And actually, they 
often justify a price increase by the necessity to afford the new payroll. However, Leeds and 
Von Allmen (2002) stated that team payrolls should not influence the ticket prices because 
it is a fixed cost and therefore cannot factor into the profit-maximizing rule of setting 
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. 
8) Previous studies showed that financial needs are among the main reasons of ticket pricing… 
therefore one would expect that in response to financial constraints (negative operating 
income, or high decrease of the profitability, debt augmentation), ticket price should 
increase. In their 2001 survey among the NFL managers, Reese and Mittelstaedt found that 
financial needs are the second reason for ticket pricing. Brunkhorst and Fenn also found 
evidence that NFL teams are maximizing their profit with respect to ticket prices.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the first model 
The name and details of variables used are detailed in the appendix E.   
sport variable observations mean
standard 
deviation
min max
Increase ticket 792 5,37% 12,81% -33% 103%
New stadium 848 3,07% 17,25% NS NS
New location 870 0,11% 3,40% NS NS
Inc winning1 788 0,03% 7,07% -23% 22%
Playoff1 810 26,17% 43,84% NS NS
Inc attendance1 814 0,40% 10,28% -38% 56%
Inc wages 788 11,17% 24,63% -66% 122%
Inc ticket1 762 5,71% 12,69% -33% 103%
Inc profit1 788 -0,14% 12,97% -51% 65%
Inc debt1 498 15,00% 364,00% -100% 1649%
Increase ticket 729 4,88% 13,76% -37% 120%
New stadium 841 3,68% 18,85% NS NS
New location 870 0,34% 5,87% NS NS
Inc winning1 783 0,10% 12,95% -51% 51%
Playoff1 840 53,21% 49,92% NS NS
Inc attendance1 805 0,39% 6,98% -42% 48%
Inc wages 783 12,45% 25,75% -71% 148%
Inc ticket1 729 4,88% 13,76% -37% 120%
Inc profit1 724 0,59% 14,80% -64% 76%
Inc debt1 460 -31,96% 338,65% -100% 587%
Increase ticket 828 5,91% 11,28% -37% 82%
New stadium 899 2,78% 16,45% NS NS
New location 928 0,54% 7,32% NS NS
Inc winning1 857 0,16% 22,16% -62% 62%
Playoff1 928 37,28% 48,38% NS NS
Inc attendance1 814 0,23% 6,90% -40% 41%
Inc wages 800 10,71% 19,71% -39% 92%
Inc ticket1 828 5,91% 11,28% -37% 82%
Inc profit1 800 0,34% 10,51% -44% 46%
Inc debt1 570 33,68% 368,51% -100% 1385%
Increase ticket 608 4,29% 15,19% -50% 125%
New stadium 808 3,22% 17,65% NS NS
New location 899 0,56% 7,44% NS NS
Inc winning1 754 0,41% 8,89% -27% 34%
Playoff1 837 51,37% 50,01% NS NS
Inc attendance1 752 0,09% 6,54% -45% 33%
Inc wages 715 12,80% 28,63% -46% 174%
Inc ticket1 638 4,37% 15,08% -50% 125%
Inc profit1 647 -0,01% 12,03% -55% 82%
Inc debt1 428 4,67% 361,98% -100% 360%
Increase ticket 2957 5,18% 13,18% -50% 125%
New stadium 3396 3,18% 17,55% NS NS
New location 3567 0,39% 6,25% NS NS
Inc winning1 3182 0,17% 14,30% -62% 62%
Playoff1 3415 42,02% 49,36% NS NS
Inc attendance1 3185 0,28% 7,84% -45% 56%
Inc wages 3086 11,76% 24,78% -71% 174%
Inc ticket1 2957 5,27% 13,16% -50% 125%
Inc profit1 2957 0,20% 12,64% -64% 82%
Inc debt1 1956 7,16% 359,64% -100% 1649%
NHL
ALL
MLB
NBA
NFL
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2.2.2. Salary cap impact on marginal cost efficiency 
First of all, we are looking for an efficiency of payroll increase on the winning percentage: 
does increase the payroll of a team more than the average of the league means more wins on the 
field? And is this effect doped by a salary cap implementation? 
The general OLS equation used will be the one below: 
 
Where: 
= percentage of change of winning from the previous season to the current one, for each 
individual team i 
 = intercept term 
= coefficients of the independent variables.  
w = percentage increase of the wages of a team i minus the average change of the league. This is the 
core variable: first you calculate the seasonal average increase of the wages for NHL and MLB 
leagues as a whole. Then you calculate the increase of the same variable for each team every year. 
And you subtract to check if you increase your wages more or less than the league. It is a 
standardized variable, with respect to the league average.  
p = past performance on field, namely playoff participation the year before and percentage 
increase/decrease of winning the season before 
 = error term, fixed effect, assuming that it is constant among teams 
 
Past performance variables have been selected for the control because an increase of the 
winning percentage from a season to another should be the consequence of what they did before on 
the field, in addition to the new talent (including staff members) they recruit for the season to come.  
 
Dummy variable has been added for NHL and MLB teams, as well as the season involved. 
Regression includes a separation of the data set: before 2005 (i.e. salary cap arrival in NHL), and 
after 2005. The goal is to seize the effect of the NHL salary cap. 
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Table II: Descriptive statistics of the model 
The name and details of variables used are detailed in the appendix F.  
sport variable observations mean
standard 
deviation
min max
inc winning 703 0,45% 8,93% -27% 34%
inc wages 697 1,69% 15,42% -78% 71%
inc wages1 656 1,62% 17,29% -109% 71%
inc winning1 694 0,44% 8,88% -27% 34%
Playoff1 703 51,47% 50,00% NS NS
inc winning 732 0,02% 7,08% -23% 22%
inc wages 732 2,10% 20,36% -84% 99%
inc wages1 728 2,27% 20,93% -84% 99%
inc winning1 732 0,04% 6,94% -23% 22%
Playoff1 719 26,42% 44,12% NS NS
inc winning 1435 0,23% 8,04% -27% 34%
inc wages 1429 1,90% 18,11% -84% 99%
inc wages1 1384 1,96% 19,28% -109% 99%
inc winning1 1426 0,24% 7,95% -27% 34%
Playoff1 1422 39,17% 48,80% NS NS
NHL
MLB
ALL
 
 
Main hypotheses  
In a famous economics book, Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus define 
economics as the study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable commodities and 
distribute them among different people. Behind this definition are two key ideas in economics: that 
goods are scarce and that society must use its resources efficiently. Indeed, economics is an important 
subject because of the fact of scarcity and the desire for efficiency. 
The main hypothesis comes directly from this: the implementation of a salary cap leads team 
to less resources in term of player salaries. Even though they have enough money to afford bigger 
salaries, there is a restriction, coming from the league management itself, fixing a maximum that can’t 
be exceeded. Therefore, if we follow Paul Samuelson’s theory, teams under a salary cap agreement 
should be more efficient in the way they spend the limited amount at their disposal. 
To summarize, assuming that professional sports teams are win maximizing, in a context of 
a salary cap regulation, teams that invest more on salaries compare to the league average should enjoy 
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more wins than their counterpart in other sports who are not subject to a salary cap regulation 
constraint.   
We will now have a look at the main results of the study, and the analysis. 
 
Section 3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
2.3.1. Ticket price alteration 
First of all, we found significant variables in all the regressions. However, it appears clear 
that strong differences exist among the four leagues. And there is a clear pattern: MLB always fit the 
best the model. On the other hand it appears very complicated to capture a valid model for the NFL 
for the period 1991/2017.  
 
NFL 
Over the sample period, in the first regression, out of the 8 variables selected in the global 
model, four reveals a significance, and one only in the expected direction. Table I shows that 
winning more games, increasing the ticket price and the profit the year before, and increasing the 
wages for the season to come, these four variables have a significant negative impact at the 1 or 5% 
level. 
The only expected results is the increase in the previous year ticket price. Ticket price 
increase of the previous season has a negative impact on the change for the new season. If the team 
enjoyed an increase of the profit the year before, they tend to increase more their prices for the new 
season. The regression does not include a relocation effect, due to some missing data on the wages 
and debt that offset the relocation occurred in the sample period. A relocation is obviously a rare 
event, even more than a new stadium. However, taken separately from the debt (no data available for 
debt in the nineties), the team that experienced a new location should increase their prices by 14.8% 
(Table II). But it is barely significant (10% level). Winning is always significant at the 1%, but with 
a decrease of 7.5% for each additional 10% of victory… very surprising that winning more the year 
before does not lead to increase prices. On the contrary, reaching the playoff during the previous 
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season leads to a 2.3% increase of the price, at the 5% level of significance. But when you push with 
final game or even title, no significance has been found.  
When we run the same regression for the premium ticket (appendix H), with only 185 
sample (6 years, from 2011 to 2016), there is no clear pattern either. The new stadium effect is 
significant at the 1% level, with a 23.2% of price increase. But only 2 cases of new stadium 
happened between 2011 and 2016 in the NFL. The price increased of the last year has a significant 
negative impact on the year the come. A pattern similar for the other leagues too.  
Overall the model doesn’t really fit, and we cannot draw many conclusion with NFL. This 
is not surprising for several reasons. First of all, the gate receipt in the NFL represents less 
percentage of the revenue than the three other sports. The level was around 30% back in 1990, and 
it’s now around 15%. It doesn’t mean that NFL teams doesn’t care about ticket price fixing, but it’s 
not a major source of revenue for them. A more important reason is the combination of three factors: 
over the sample period, NFL is the most popular sport, they only have 8 games per season to play in 
their home stadium, and almost all the team experienced a 100% attendance percentage each and 
every year. When you are the most popular sport, with only 8 games to attend on weekend for the 
fans every year, you don’t have to worry too much about the ticket price. No matter what happened 
the year before, you stadium will always be full for the next season, due to a happy combination of 
scarcity and attractiveness. Therefore, NFL teams are the less sensitive to most of the factor selected 
for this research. The most surprising is the absence of significance of playing in a new stadium. 
This factor is always highly significant in the other sports, but we can’t find robust significance for 
the NFL. 
 
NBA 
The NBA shows more significant and expected pattern in terms of ticket price change, 
despite unavoidable omitted variables in the model. Out of the ten variables checked in this paper, 6 
were significant in the NBA, with (Table I) or without the debt (Table II) included in the model. The 
strongest pattern is for the new stadium, location and attendance percentage of the previous season. 
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Once again, in this paper, we didn’t consider that teams were playing in a new stadium when they 
were relocated, to avoid a redundant effect. In both cases, NBA teams that experienced relocation or 
new stadium tend to increase their price by 15% and 18%, significant at the 1% and 5% level.  
A variable “after lockout” was added in that model, because two NBA seasons were 
reduced in term of regular season games number. A negative effect was founded but it’s not 
significant. In some of the regressions ran separately we found positive and significant effect. 
Despite this, it is hard to conclude for any robust effect on ticket prices. 
Winning was also founded significant, in the expected direction. But only in the second 
regression model, without the debt (Table II). This regression was used because of the absence of the 
debt data for the nineties. The sample was therefore bigger in the second model, without debt.   
Wages play also a role in the NBA ticket pricing: 10% more spent in the payroll would 
increase the price by almost 18%. This is consistent with the claim of NBA owners that they have to 
increase ticket price to afford the payroll. But it’s contradictory with Leeds and Von Allmen (2002) 
works. The fact that NBA has a soft salary cap, contrary to NHL or NFL, might be one of the 
explanation. They have many different options to exceed the salary cap. That gives them the 
opportunity to hire more talented players from a year to another, and try to over perform. Making the 
team better, more attractive, is not inconsistent with an increase of the ticket price. If the show is 
expected better, the price should follow.  
Finally, two patterns are very specific to the NBA: it’s the only sport that shows a 
significance for an increase of the debt. A 10% increase in the debt level will correspond to a 2.6% 
in price increase. The other one is unexpected: there is no significant effect of the previous season 
ticket price alteration on the current season change. The coefficient is negative though, like the three 
other sports.  
The premium control wasn’t possible for the NBA, due to the absence of available data. 
But overall, the efficiency of the model is better than for the NFL, there is no doubt about it. The fact 
that the stadiums are not always full and the high number of games in a season might be an 
explanation, even if the attendance level is somehow always >90% on average. 
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NHL 
For the NHL, in addition to a lockout effect dummy variable, a Canada dummy was added. 
20% of the NHL teams are Canadian, so it seemed relevant to add a dummy. However, this paper is 
only about percentage of change in ticket price, so it would have been surprising to find a Canadian 
effect. And it’s actually not the case. Table I and II summarizes the results.  
The lockout dummy shows no significance on ticket price. Which is not surprising. Taken 
separately for 3 other regressions, it shows negative significance for one of them. The 2004/2005 
season, which was cancelled, is the main explanation for this effect: teams wanted to reconquer their 
fans by decreasing ticket prices. 
Among the interesting things in the NHL, we see the strongest pattern between winning 
and ticket price alteration. Reaching the post season the year before equal a 2.8% increase in price, 
5.9% for a final game and 9.7% in case of title. The winning percentage also impact positively the 
new price. 
Playing in a new stadium seems to have a significant effect on ticket price. Teams enjoy a 
13% increase in price, significant at the 1% level. Same for new location, with 65% increase in price, 
even higher influence.  
Financial data has no impact on price change. It is quite surprising, notably because NHL 
is the less profitable business of this study. One could expect that to counterbalance this effect they 
would increase their price. But they might be afraid of losing fans if they increase the price too 
drastically.  
Finally, increasing the wages or the attendance percentage seem to have no effect on price. 
Hard to explain why, maybe because the star effect is not strong in NHL. The fan base is very 
trustful, with a high fidelity. And the fact that the winning dispersion is very low compare to NBA or 
NFL leads teams to be very careful in their expectations toward an effort in the payroll (Figure 1). 
There is less guarantee that recruiting the best players will lead to a lot more success on the field. 
NHL teams are very willing to increase their ticket price after success on the field, but not to 
anticipate the success after recruiting good players that increase the payroll.  
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Premium control was possible for the 2004 to 2015 period, but because of missing data, 
the sample size is 178. Nothing really specific to take from the premium seats, as you can see in 
appendix H. 
 
MLB 
MLB shows the strongest relation between the variable chosen and the seasonal price 
direction. Six variables out of eight show significance, in the second regression (once we dropped 
the debt, not significant, table II). New stadium, new location, playoffs participation, wages, ticket 
price and increase attendance of the year before are all significant at the 1% level (except the playoff, 
5% level).  
One interesting point is again the wages increase that impact the change in the ticket price, 
in a positive way. Even if some theory exists saying that it shouldn’t be the case, it is not so 
surprising to see such a relationship, especially in the MLB: the baseball league, contrary to the 
others, doesn’t have to worry about a salary cap. MLB only have to worry about a luxury tax, which 
consist of a fee to pay in case you exceed a certain amount in your payroll. This fee is then shared 
among the other teams, to balance the competition. This light payroll agreement has a direct 
consequence: MLB has the highest player expense dispersion among teams, by far, of all leagues. 
The payroll dispersion in the MLB is around four times higher on average (Figure 2). Signing one or 
two new famous players and increase the ticket price consequently appears somehow a natural 
process. There is a race to hire the best players in the MLB, and, similarly to what we find in 
European soccer, MLB teams have to increase dramatically their revenues to catch up. Ticket price 
is one of the tools they can use to achieve this goal. However, the increase is modest: 50% of payroll 
increase = 3% more on the ticket price.  
An increase of 10% of attendance percentage will lead to a 2% increase in the price. This 
is particularly interesting for the MLB because it is the league were attendance is the lowest, for 
obvious reasons already explained. It is then not surprising that they seize the occasion to increase 
their ticket price when the attendance is increasing.  
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Like in all the other leagues, new stadium (+40%) and new city effect are the strongest, by 
far (and significant at the 1% level). 
Overall, MLB shows the most rational way of altering their ticket price. It is not surprising 
since they have by far the biggest offer in term of games, with more than 80 games per season at 
home. Including a lot of weekdays, which means more difficult to have a lot of supporter available.  
Among the variables that have no effect, we find winning the previous season title or final game 
participation. This is not so surprising considering that MLB is also the sport where the winning 
dispersion is the tightest (Figure 1). Success the year before is not a guarantee for the next season, 
this is the well-known glorious uncertainty of outcome in sports, but it is even more the case in 
baseball. Therefore, a team that enjoyed a big success the previous season might be reluctant to 
increase their ticket price because they’re afraid of having a not so good next season, and lose 
supporters if the ticket price was set too high. However, there is a playoff effect. But playoff is a 
more common thing for MLB teams. Almost half of them have the chance to participate every year. 
The uncertainty is therefore less important and might lead teams to a price increase: +2.2% for a 
playoff participation, significant at the 5% level of confidence. 
Premium control was possible for the 2011/2016 period, with a 137 sample size. During 
that period, the new stadium and the increase of the previous year price before have the main impact 
(respectively positive and negative, appendix H).  
 
All 
As explained before, despite some obvious differences among all these professional sports, 
there is still an interest to study the pattern of the four leagues together. First of all, we talk here 
about alteration of a price, up or down. We are not talking about the absolute value of a ticket, but 
only of the percentage of modification from a year to another. Therefore the similitude appears 
stronger than the differences Furthermore, some dummy variables chosen in this study occurs few 
times in the life of a team. It is particularly true for the new stadium (3.18% of the sample size) and 
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the new location (0.39% of the sample). By gathering the four sports, we could have a better 
representation of the real effect of these two variables on the ticket price alteration.  
According to table I, eight of the nine variables shows significance in the main regression, 
all of them at the 5 or 1% level. Let’s start by the only non-significant variable, the increase of the 
debt level. Since this variable is significant only for the NBA, it is not surprising that the global 
regression doesn’t show any significance, nor any coefficient (close to zero). If financial constraints 
are determinants of the ticket price, it looks like it’s not the level of debt that matters… 
The second regression, without the debt level (table II), is therefore more interesting to 
analyze. We lose one significant variable, the profit. Similarly to the debt level, we couldn’t find any 
strong pattern or influence of the profit in the ticket price alteration in each leagues. So once again, it 
is a little surprise. Overall the influence of financial statements, especially distress case (what we 
looked for), on ticket price was a bit disappointing. We couldn’t show any strong relationship 
between teams that experienced some financial constraints and an alteration of their ticket price that 
would be different from the other teams. Going deeper in that topic might be necessary to better 
capture a possible effect, for example by looking at cumulative data (last 3 years of financial 
statements, to compare with three years of ticket price alteration for example).  
All the other variables are significant. As usual, new location (+38%) and new stadium 
(+18%) are the two factors that impact the most the ticket price. The increase winning has a 
surprising negative effect. However, when we run the same regression by replacing playoff with 
final game participation or title, there is no significance. Overall, the winning increase of the 
previous year might not be so significant. Maybe the absolute level of winning would be more 
significant. Fans are willing to attend games if their team is a good one (except for NFL, not 
sensitive to the quality of the team due to the scarcity of the offer and the popularity of football). 
However, playoff participation, final game and winning the title the year before are all significant. 
The surprise is that there seems to have no bonus for reaching the last stage of the season, because 
the price alteration is almost the same in all cases (+3%). It might be due to the insensitiveness of 
NFL that alter the global regression.   
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Last point concerning the significant variables, increasing the wages by 50% lead to a 3% 
increase in ticket price. It is significant at the 1% level. However, the size of the effect is not so large. 
It is an evidence that team are sensitive to the level of wages when it’s time to fix a ticket price. 
However, when team management explains that they have to increase ticket price in order to pay the 
salary of the players, it sounds largely exaggerated. It can explain only a very small part of the 
increase.  
The premium control has 481 sample, versus 2.587 for the main regression (appendix H). 
New stadium and new location are playing a major role in terms of altering premium ticket price, by 
respectively 50 and 80%! The previous augmentation of price has a negative and significant impact, 
as expected. The other variables doesn’t show any significance but it is not surprising considering 
the sample size and the various sports: we would probably need a bigger sample size to find 
evidence for more variables.  
Another control not mentioned before has been made for all the sports separately and 
together: the sample has been divided into different period (1990/1999; 2000/2009; 2010/2017). 
There is no significant difference or change over time. The pattern is almost the same in the nineties 
and nowadays, despite some changes in the tool at disposable of the teams (namely, selling via 
internet, yield management, etc…).  
Similarly, to control for the importance of the yield pricing, a control has been made to see 
if the change in winning from the season before to the current season had an impact, assuming that a 
team who enjoy more success during the current season might increase the price. The answer is very 
clear: no significant impact of using the change in winning of the year before with the change in 
winning for the current year. The significance of the change of winning of the previous year is 
always stronger than the change of winning of the current year (which is almost never significant). 
Of course, it’s not enough to capture the total effect of the yield pricing, but it is a good point.  
You can find in Appendix G the regression with significant variables only for the four 
sports and the global one.  
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Table I: 1st model regression 
Variable details are in the appendix E 
 
============================================================= 
                            Dependent variable:               
               ---------------------------------------------- 
                               Increase ticket                    
                  NFL      NBA      NHL      MLB       All    
                  (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)       (5)    
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada                             0.023                      
                                  (0.083)                     
                                                              
afterlockout              -0.001   0.004                      
                         (0.026)  (0.036)                     
                                                              
New stadium     -0.040   0.215***  0.094   0.359*** 0.150***  
                (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.062)  (0.033)   (0.021)  
                                                              
New location             0.173**  1.262*** 0.966*** 0.537***  
                         (0.078)  (0.149)  (0.110)   (0.057)  
                                                              
Inc winning1   -0.075***  0.037    0.133    0.042   -0.044**  
                (0.023)  (0.051)  (0.089)  (0.081)   (0.022)  
                                                              
Playoff1         0.014   0.036**   0.023    0.019   0.027***  
                (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.013)   (0.007)  
                                                              
Inc attendance1  0.006   0.201**   0.124   0.150*** 0.174***  
                (0.079)  (0.096)  (0.118)  (0.053)   (0.040)  
                                                              
Inc wages      -0.074**  0.174***  -0.049  0.079**   0.043**  
                (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.044)  (0.033)   (0.017)  
                                                              
Inc ticket1    -0.134***  -0.028  -0.106** -0.082** -0.102*** 
                (0.045)  (0.055)  (0.047)  (0.039)   (0.024)  
                                                              
Inc profit1     0.141**   0.050    -0.035   -0.043   0.068**  
                (0.059)  (0.051)  (0.076)  (0.058)   (0.031)  
                                                              
Inc debt1       -0.0001  0.027***  0.013    0.002     0.004   
                (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.005)   (0.003)  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations      492      431      349      474      1,746   
R2               0.069    0.179    0.260    0.346     0.114   
============================================================= 
Note:                             *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table II: 2nd model regression, without the debt, to extend the sample to the nineties (no data 
available for debt level in the nineties) 
Variable details are in the appendix E 
 
=============================================================== 
                             Dependent variable:                
               ------------------------------------------------ 
                               Increase ticket                     
                  NFL      NBA       NHL       MLB       All    
                  (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)    
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada                              0.127                       
                                   (0.080)                      
                                                                
After lockout             -0.007    0.012                       
                         (0.021)   (0.035)                      
                                                                
New stadium     -0.013   0.179*** 0.124***  0.404***  0.181***  
                (0.027)  (0.027)   (0.045)   (0.024)   (0.015)  
                                                                
New location    0.148*   0.155**  0.658***  0.977***  0.383***  
                (0.080)  (0.073)   (0.108)   (0.106)   (0.045)  
                                                                
Inc winning1   -0.073***  0.076*   0.163*     0.058    -0.031*  
                (0.021)  (0.041)   (0.084)   (0.063)   (0.018)  
                                                                
Playoff1        0.023**  0.023**   0.028*    0.022**  0.027***  
                (0.010)  (0.011)   (0.016)   (0.010)   (0.006)  
                                                                
Inc attendance1 -0.018   0.187**    0.079   0.192***  0.153***  
                (0.060)  (0.077)   (0.104)   (0.043)   (0.032)  
                                                                
Inc wages        0.007   0.126***  -0.057   0.060***  0.060***  
                (0.022)  (0.025)   (0.041)   (0.019)   (0.011)  
                                                                
Inc ticket1    -0.160***  -0.023  -0.161*** -0.090*** -0.108*** 
                (0.036)  (0.038)   (0.044)   (0.033)   (0.019)  
                                                                
Inc profit1       0.048    0.019    -0.015    -0.004     0.013   
                (0.041)  (0.034)   (0.058)   (0.034)   (0.020)  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations      739      638       494       704      2,575   
R2               0.051    0.184     0.155     0.387     0.115   
=============================================================== 
Note:                               *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Marginal salary cost efficiency, salary cap effect 
As explained before, the goal of this part is to find an effect of the implementation of a 
salary cap on the utilization of the wages, and check this effect on the winning percentage. Does 
NHL and MLB teams use their wages spending efficiently in term of increase winning percentage 
and does the implementation of a salary cap has an impact on this effect?  
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The results show some strong effect that will be explained below, but it is important to 
notice that there are some unavoidable omitted variables that makes the model not perfect, even after 
control. Fixed effect model has been used, assuming that it was constant among teams.  
Worth noting that each year, the percentage increase winning of the market is almost zero, 
since there are only three possible outcome: win, lose or draw (quite rare in MLB though). Therefore, 
a positive increase of winning means, as a consequence, over performing the market, because the 
number of wins increase of the market as a whole is zero. Sports is a zero sum games in terms of 
winning in general.  
In NHL the winning percentage corresponds to the points obtained divided by the total of 
possible points. Because the match draw is a common result, we cannot use a simple winning ratio 
like for MLB. However, on league average basis, the percentage of points change from a season to 
the next is very small, and the percentage of points obtained by the league as a whole doesn’t move 
each year: it’s a very stable ratio.  
The results are summarized in table III and IV, with different variables: table III includes 
the control variables, while table IV is only focused on the wages effect on winning percentage from 
the previous to the current season.  
It shows that before 2005, NHL teams tended to be less efficient than MLB teams: i.e. 
NHL teams that spend more money than the league average performed less than their MLB 
counterparts. The regression shows that the NHL and MLB teams, before 2005, were efficient 
(regression 1 and 3 on table III and IV): on average, spending 20% more than the league average 
bring 1.2% more victories in NHL and 1.6% in MLB, significant at the 5% and 1% level. Regression 
5, in table III and IV, with an interaction term to capture the effect before salary cap, shows that this 
difference between NHL and MLB is not significant.  
Controlling for other factors in table III, such as the increase wages of the season before, 
the playoff participation and the increase of wins of the previous season, the results are similar. 
Surprisingly, playoff participation and increase winning of the previous season tends to have a 
negative impact on the winning of the next year. It shows the difficulty for NHL and MLB teams to 
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be successful several years in a row. Overall, before 2005, we cannot conclude to any difference 
between NHL and MLB in terms of efficiency of marginal salary spending on winning increase. 
Teams that invest more than their league average performs globally better in NHL and MLB, but 
there is no significant difference between the two leagues.  
After 2005, the results are slightly different: NHL teams that invest more compare to their 
league average over perform compare to their MLB counterpart (regression 2, 4 and 6 in both table 
III and IV). On average MLB teams that invest 20% more than the average will gain 1.2% more 
games. For NHL team, the ratio grows to 3.1%. The difference of 1.9% between NHL and MLB is 
significant at the 5% level (regression 6, table III and IV) and similar whether you integrate other 
variables or not. In both cases, NHL teams that invests 20% more than their league average performs 
1.9% more than their MLB counterparts. One could conclude that the scarcity effect on human 
allocation of resources defined by Samuelson in economics, could also apply to wages spending in 
sports: the limitation of resources available for NHL teams, i.e. the fact that they were not allowed to 
spend more than a predefined amount for paying the players, leads to more efficiency in these 
spending. At the same time, MLB teams, which never experiment a salary cap, saw this efficiency 
decreasing a bit, i.e. teams that invest more than the league average still win more than the others, 
but at a little lower level than before. For information, Appendix J shows the payroll increase of the 
four major leagues between 1991 and 2017: the NHL compounded annual growth rate is 9.75% 
while the MLB is 8.81%. The pace is high, and seeing a team increasing his payroll a lot more than 
the league average is not a rare event.  
To control for a possible too long run analysis effect that might include more potential bias, 
the same regression has been made for the period 1999/2004 and 2006/2011 (Appendix L and M). 
The results show an even stronger impact after 2005: at the 1% significance level, NHL teams that 
invest 20% more in salary than their league average win 5% more victories than their MLB 
counterpart. It means 4 more wins in a season. As a matter of example, during the last four seasons, 
all the teams ranked right after the last qualified team for the playoff, were lagging behind for less 
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than 5%. During the same period, MLB teams that invests more than the league average doesn’t 
show any efficiency: more salary equal no more wins on the field. 
We can conclude that the effect we were looking for exists, and it is significant in all the 
regressions. However, the size of the impact might appear not so impressive: but we are talking 
about MLB and NHL, two sports where the winning percentage dispersion (Figure 1) is very low: 
therefore, one or two percent more wins in a season can make the difference to reach the post season 
or not, like we saw in the previous paragraph. Using the salary cap as a tool to lead teams toward 
more efficiency in terms of recruiting good players seem relevant. From that perspective, 
implementing such a regulation in sports like MLB of European soccer should probably be discussed 
more seriously: it’s a good way to secure the growth of the wages by finding a revenue sharing 
agreement between owners and players, and give the teams the possibility to show even more their 
skills in terms of investing on good players. Of course a lot of other factors has to be taken into 
account before making such a big decision, but it is a good pros in favor of the salary cap.  
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Table III: 2nd model regression 
Variable details are in the appendix F 
                     
======================================================================== 
                                 Seasons 1991 / 2017                  
             ----------------------------------------------------------- 
                                     Increase winning                          
             NHL<2005  NHL>2005  MLB<2005  MLB>2005  int<2005  int>2005  
                (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inc wages     0.060**  0.164***  0.081***   0.052**  0.080***   0.058**  
              (0.024)   (0.045)   (0.015)   (0.023)   (0.016)   (0.025)  
                                                                         
NHL                                                  0.025***   0.011**  
                                                      (0.006)   (0.005)  
                                                                         
Inc wages1     0.026     0.049     0.001    -0.017     0.009     0.009   
              (0.023)   (0.034)   (0.014)   (0.022)   (0.013)   (0.019)  
                                                                         
Playoff1     -0.064*** -0.050*** -0.019**  -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
              (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.006)  
                                                                         
Inc winning1 -0.293*** -0.281*** -0.410*** -0.275*** -0.340*** -0.276*** 
              (0.051)   (0.053)   (0.052)   (0.053)   (0.037)   (0.037)  
                                                                         
Inc wages*NHL                                          -0.031    0.097**  
                                                      (0.027)   (0.047)  
                                                                         
Constant     0.045***  0.026***    0.002    0.010**   0.008*   0.012***  
              (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations    319       330       340       360       659       690    
R2             0.253     0.237     0.248     0.180     0.238     0.210   
======================================================================== 
Note:                                        *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table IV: regression with the interaction term variable only 
Variable details are in the appendix F 
 
================================================================== 
                              Seasons 1991 / 2017                  
             ----------------------------------------------------- 
                                Increase winning                      
             NHL<2005 NHL>2005 MLB<2005 MLB>2005 int<2005 int>2005 
               (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)    
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inc wages     0.027   0.120*** 0.067***  0.023   0.067***  0.023   
             (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.028)  
                                                                   
NHL                                               0.007    0.002   
                                                 (0.006)  (0.006)  
                                                                   
Inc wages*NHL                                     -0.040  0.097**  
                                                 (0.027)  (0.047)  
                                                                   
Constant      0.006    0.001    -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001  
             (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations   350      360      398      360      748      720    
R2            0.003    0.022    0.050    0.002    0.025    0.015   
================================================================== 
Note:                                  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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2.3.3. Other findings and interesting facts 
Figure 1 shows the winning dispersion (standard deviation) among the different teams in 
each league. NBA and NFL has been added to NHL and MLB to have a full picture of major North 
American collective sports. Interesting to see that MLB and NHL are close, showing a better 
competitive balance than NFL and NBA, i.e. a smaller winning dispersion. The pattern is quite clear 
over the last 27 years. NFL implemented a hard version of the salary cap in 1993. However, it seems 
that this implementation didn’t imply a big improvement of the competitive balance (assuming that a 
good competitive balance is materialized by a low winning dispersion). It is interesting, because in 
general it is one of the major argument for such a new regulation.  
In the case of NHL though, the primary goal of the salary cap implementation wasn’t the 
competitive balance. Because just like in MLB, the winning dispersion was already low, i.e. the 
difference between the best and the worst teams is not very huge, contrary to NFL or NBA. The 
main concern was more an equilibrium in terms of spending, and to improve the team profitability, 
because this was clearly an issue for NHL teams before the salary cap regulation. We can see a small 
effect on competitive balance after 2005 in NHL, but it’s very modest. We might assume that the 
increasing efficiency of the teams spending in salaries have partially offset the salary cap effect. 
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Figure 1: winning standard deviation among the four leagues 
 
Source: basketball/hockey/football/baseball-reference website 
 
Another interesting fact, which was already mentioned in this paper, is the player expense 
huge dispersion over time within the four sports. While there was almost no difference at the 
beginning of the nineties, the increase of the wages expenses dispersion for the past 27 years is very 
impressive. Noteworthy that NFL salary cap exists since 1994, and NHL since 2006 only. However, 
the salary cap effect seems to be clear, especially if you look at NFL and NHL, who implemented a 
hard version of this salary cap. Figure 2 shows that the dispersion of wages as a proportion of the 
average salary among teams (standard deviation over average salary, to have comparable data 
between the different leagues) falls dramatically right after the new rule. NBA (soft salary cap) and 
MLB (no salary cap, only a luxury tax) have the highest dispersion, and, unsurprisingly, it’s the only 
two leagues that shows an impact of wages expenses on the ticket price change. NFL and NHL 
shows the lowest dispersion in the payroll, which is the consequence of a hard salary cap, because 
they have no other choice than the respect of the limitation. This is totally consistent with the fact 
they have to be more accurate in their player recruitment: since they can’t make the difference by 
spending a lot more than their competitors, they have to be more careful to select the good players.  
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Figure 2: average payroll standard deviation 
 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
 
Section 4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AGENDA 
It is very difficult to capture all the reasons why a professional team would increase or 
decrease the price of the tickets. This study helped to confirm previous works by Mondello and 
Rishe, with some differences, and also to add some new variables to better understand the 
mechanisms that impact the average of ticket prices in North American professional sports.  
However, it is worth to recall that using ticket price average doesn’t capture the entire 
effect since lots of teams are using yield management for pricing (different prices might be apply for 
every game, depending on the day and opponent), in addition to the usual different range of seats 
pricing. However, both are reflected in the average price. But the difference within each category 
can’t be captured. It could change some of the results.  
Moreover, despite some robust findings in term of significance, the model failed to capture 
a strong explanatory power. It means that some variable are not included in the model. The fact that 
the dependent variable is just a proxy that can’t capture the entire pricing process might again be a 
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part of the explanation. Furthermore, as Reese & Mittelstaedt found in 2001, some variables that 
matters for NFL managers are hard to quantify. Finally, there is probably a part of improvisation in 
the process of ticket pricing.  
One possible extend for studying the ticket pricing in sports would be to capture more the 
effect of the dynamic and variable pricing. The main issue to conduct such a research is the data 
availability. But by reducing the sample, and focusing on specific teams, it sounds feasible.  
Digging into the importance of the financial statements on ticket price could be another interesting 
area. Except for the payroll, the variable chosen in that study failed to show a strong correlation 
between financial results or financial structure and alteration of ticket price. Which is in 
contradiction with the claim of NFL managers, but also consistent with the fact that team managers 
cannot directly impact potential financial results on their fans without losing some of them. There is 
an obvious link between the ticket price and the financial statements of professional teams, but it 
would be interesting to clearly show that the opposite is also true, that financial results of the firm 
impact the ticket prices.  
 
Concerning the effect of salary cap implementation on teams salary expenses efficiency , 
one of the pitfall is the recent tendency to create super teams: despite the existence of a salary cap 
and luxury tax that should prevent from this effect, we saw some super teams being created. Why? 
Because some superstar or very good players, in order to win a championship, accepts a lower salary 
than the one they could pretend to join teams where other star players are already in. It is particularly 
true for the NBA but can be apply to any other league. But one can consider that it is part of the 
management team talent to attract very skilled player for a lower price than their theoretical market 
value, arguing they have more chances of success by joining their team. So it is still somehow 
reflecting the team management efficiency.  
Another problem with the analysis is obviously that baseball and hockey are two different 
sports, in spite of a lot of similarities. The MLB is therefore not a perfect control group. But the fact 
that the two leagues show a similar pattern before 2005, and the fact that this pattern changed after 
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2005 is a positive sign for the robustness of the study.  
Further studies could be conducted to go beyond the salary cap implementation, and for 
example dig into the characteristics of each individual team’s answer to the law change, and the 
other regulations that might have changed in parallel to the salary cap and also have an impact on the 
efficiency of the teams. The salary cap is a global regulation that have consequences on competitive 
balance and winning dispersion within the different leagues. But the North American major leagues 
have also many other rules to follow, especially when it comes to the salary of players: going further 
in leagues specific regulation might be a possible topic for further studies.  
 
 39 
APPENDIX 
Appendix A: gate receipt percentage in the total revenue 
league 1991 1996 2003 2010 2016 
MLB 33,2% 39,1% 35,2% 36,4% 28,6% 
NBA 42,4% 40,6% 37,5% 30,1% 25,4% 
NFL 23,6% 29,1% 23,7% 21,4% 16,3% 
NHL 63,8% 60,5% 45,1% 41,4% 36,6% 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
 
 
Appendix B: average population in each league, in million 
league 
average 
population 1991 
average 
population 2017 
MLB 4,882 6,135 
NBA 4,400 5,549 
NFL 4,207 5,377 
NHL 5,385 6,020 
Source: US and Canadian Census bureau 
 
 
Appendix C: average ticket price among the four major leagues 
 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
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Appendix D: NHL salary cap level since instauration in 2005/2006 season 
 
Source: https://originalsixanalytics.com/tag/salary-cap-efficiency/ 
 
 
Appendix E: list of variables and meaning, 1st model (ticket price alteration) 
Increase ticket: change of the average ticket price from season before to current season (in percentage) 
Increase premium: change of the average premium ticket price from season before to current season 
(in percentage) 
Canada: dummy variable used for Canadian teams in the NHL 
After lockout: dummy variable, one season after a season with a lockout (NBA and NHL only) 
New stadium: dummy variable when a team plays in a new stadium, only used the first year of playing  
New location: dummy variable when a team is relocated, only used the first year of the relocation 
Inc winning1: percentage increase of winning from two seasons before to the previous season 
Playoff1: dummy variable used if a team reached the post season the season before 
Inc attendance1: percentage increase of attendance from two seasons before to the previous season 
Inc wages: percentage increase of wages from the previous season before to the current season 
Inc ticket1: percentage increase of average ticket price from two seasons before to the previous season 
Inc premium1: percentage increase of average premium ticket price from two seasons before to the 
previous season 
Inc profit1: percentage increase of operating profit from two seasons before to the previous season 
Inc debt1: percentage increase of debt from two seasons before to the previous season 
Inc attendance1: percentage increase of attendance from two seasons before to the previous season  
Title1: dummy variable, 1 if the team won the championship the previous season. 0 if not.  
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Appendix F: list of variables and meaning, 2nd model (salary cap effect on payroll efficiency) 
Increase winning: percentage increase of winning from the previous season to the current one 
Inc wages: percentage of increase of the wages from the season before to current season, minus the 
average percentage of increase of the league for the same season 
Inc wages1: percentage of increase of the wages from two seasons before to the previous season, 
minus the average percentage of increase of the league for the same season 
Inc winning1: percentage increase of winning from two seasons before to the previous one 
Playoff1: dummy variable for playoff participation the previous season 
NHL: dummy variable for NHL teams 
Inc wages*NHL = interaction term between NHL team and the increase wages variable, to capture the 
effect of salary cap on NHL teams efficiency  
 
 
Appendix G: 1st model regression, include significant variables only 
=============================================================== 
                             Dependent variable:                
               ------------------------------------------------ 
                               Increase ticket                     
                  NFL      NBA       NHL       MLB       All    
                  (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)    
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
New stadium               0.218*** 0.133***  0.404***  0.180***  
                         (0.050)   (0.040)   (0.024)   (0.015)  
                                                                
New location    0.375***  0.160**  0.701***  0.972***  0.381***  
                (0.057)  (0.078)   (0.107)   (0.105)   (0.045)  
                                                                
Inc winning1   -0.076***            0.123              -0.033*  
                (0.020)            (0.080)             (0.018)  
                                                                
Playoff1         0.023**  0.040***  0.035**   0.025**  0.029***  
                (0.010)  (0.013)   (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.006)  
                                                                
Inc ticket1    -0.172***          -0.142*** -0.096*** -0.103*** 
                (0.036)            (0.041)   (0.033)   (0.019)  
                                                                
Inc wages                 0.181***           0.061***  0.050***  
                         (0.036)             (0.018)   (0.011)  
 
Inc attendance1            0.168*            0.203***  0.170***  
                         (0.091)             (0.041)   (0.032)  
                                                                
Inc debt1                 0.027***                               
                         (0.010)                 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations      793      432       547       704      2,682   
R2               0.095    0.168     0.135     0.386     0.111   
=============================================================== 
Note:                               *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix H: 1st model regression, for premium ticket 
             ------------------------------------- 
                          Increase premium               
               NFL      NHL       MLB       all    
               (1)      (2)       (3)       (4)    
-------------------------------------------------- 
After lockout          0.037              -0.026   
                      (0.074)             (0.046)  
                                                   
New stadium  0.236***  -0.003  1.559***  0.501***  
             (0.086)  (0.218)   (0.178)   (0.094)  
                                                   
New location          0.807***           0.801***  
                      (0.227)             (0.184)  
                                                   
Inc winning1  -0.081   0.582**    0.202     0.021   
             (0.054)  (0.258)   (0.304)   (0.074)  
                                                   
title1        0.050    0.043     0.006     0.033   
             (0.050)  (0.116)   (0.081)   (0.050)  
                                                   
Inc Att1       0.214    -0.353   -0.195    -0.197   
             (0.196)  (0.359)   (0.210)   (0.149)  
                                                   
Inc wages     -0.064   -0.121    0.110    -0.013   
             (0.066)  (0.093)   (0.094)   (0.049)  
                                                   
Inc premium1 -0.212*  -0.187*  -0.277*** -0.237*** 
             (0.116)  (0.095)   (0.072)   (0.050)  
                                                   
Inc profit1   0.096    -0.101    0.033    -0.007   
             (0.130)  (0.186)   (0.166)   (0.094)  
                                                   
Inc debt1     0.004    0.027     0.011     0.009   
             (0.007)  (0.034)   (0.017)   (0.009)  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Observations   185      159       137       481    
R2            0.095    0.192     0.564     0.182   
================================================== 
Note:                  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix I: ticket price standard deviation among the four major leagues 
 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
 
 
Appendix J: average wages per league, in current million US dollar 
 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
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Appendix K: wages over revenue ratio per league 
 
Source: Forbes and Rodney Fort website 
 
 
Appendix L: 2nd model regression, 6 seasons before and after salary cap, only interaction term 
================================================================== 
 6 seasons before and 6 seasons after NHL 2005 salary cap 
             ----------------------------------------------------- 
                                Increase winning                      
             NHL<2005 NHL>2005 MLB<2005 MLB>2005 int<2005 int>2005 
               (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)    
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inc wages     0.082*  0.161*** 0.077***  -0.031  0.077**   -0.031  
             (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.029)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.041)  
                                                                   
NHL                                               0.009    0.003   
                                                 (0.008)  (0.008)  
                                                                   
Inc wages*NHL                                     0.004   0.193*** 
                                                 (0.050)  (0.061)  
                                                                   
Constant      0.007    0.003    -0.002   0.0001   -0.002   0.0001  
             (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
                                                                   
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations   171      180      180      180      351      360    
R2            0.021    0.058    0.040    0.004    0.033    0.038   
================================================================== 
Note:                                  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix M: 2nd model regression, 6 seasons before and after salary cap, with control variable
s 
======================================================================== 
 6 seasons before and 6 seasons after NHL 2005 salary cap 
             ----------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   Increase winning                          
             NHL<2005  NHL>2005  MLB<2005  MLB>2005  int<2005  int>2005  
                (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inc wages    0.133***  0.253***  0.089***   -0.008   0.089***   -0.001   
              (0.039)   (0.054)   (0.026)   (0.036)   (0.027)   (0.037)  
                                                                         
NHL                                                  0.023***   0.013*   
                                                      (0.008)   (0.008)  
                                                                         
Inc wages1    0.075**   0.076*    -0.041*   -0.025     0.007     0.017   
              (0.033)   (0.045)   (0.025)   (0.034)   (0.020)   (0.027)  
                                                                         
Playoff1     -0.046*** -0.064***  -0.019   -0.028**  -0.033*** -0.046*** 
              (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.008)  
                                                                         
Inc winning1 -0.338*** -0.187*** -0.299*** -0.318*** -0.335*** -0.235*** 
              (0.072)   (0.070)   (0.076)   (0.075)   (0.052)   (0.051)  
                                                                         
Inc wages*NHL                                          0.016   0.249***  
                                                      (0.046)   (0.063)  
                                                                         
Constant     0.033***  0.034***    0.002     0.008     0.005    0.012**  
              (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)  
                                                                         
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations    166       150       178       180       344       330    
R2             0.288     0.324     0.198     0.169     0.229     0.234   
======================================================================== 
Note:                                        *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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